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INTEREST-FREE LOANS AND DICKMAN v. COMMISSIONER:
A LETTER TO THE SUPREME COURT*
Louis A. DEL COTTO AND KENNETH F. JOYCE**
On February 22, 1984, the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Dickman v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, holding that intrafamily interest-free demand loans give
rise to taxable gifts under the Federal Gift Tax. The follow-
ing letter was sent to the Court on February 27, 1984. On
March 5, 1984, the House Ways and Means Committee re-
ported to the Committee of the Whole House the Tax Reform
Act of 1984, H.R. 4170, which contains proposed legislation
on the subject matter. On March 21, 1984, the Senate Fi-
nance Committee approved the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, S. 2062, which, with minor differences, generally paral-
lels the House bill. A brief discussion of the proposals follows
the letter in a postscript.
February 27, 1984
The Honorable Warren E. Burger
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One 1st Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
We have read, with great interest, the slip opinion in
Dickman et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 82-
1041, decided February 22, 1984.1
We would first like to say that we agree completely with
*Copyright 1984 by Louis A. Del Cotto and Kenneth F. Joyce.
**Professors of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New
York at Buffalo.
Our letter to the Court is reprinted in full. Several footnotes have been added to
assist the reader; only footnote 7 appeared in our original letter.
1. 52 U.S.L.W. 4222 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1984).
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the Court's conclusion that intrafamily interest-free demand
loans involve taxable gifts.
Secondly, we also agree completely with the Court's basic
economic rationale that permitting a person to use money in-
terest free involves a transfer of economic value.
Thirdly, we agree completely with that part of the Court's
supporting rationale that holds that gift taxation of in-
trafamily interest-free demand loans is necessary to protect
against the erosion of the estate tax base.
We are, however, extremely dismayed by the following
three sentences in the opinion:
A substantial no-interest loan from parent to child creates significant
tax benefits for the lender quite apart from the economic advantages to
the borrower. This is especially so when an individual in a high income
tax bracket transfers income-producing property to an individual in a
lower income tax bracket, thereby reducing the taxable income of the
high-bracket taxpayer at the expense, ultimately, of all other taxpayers
and the government. Subjecting interest-free loans to gift taxation min-
imizes the potential loss to the federal fisc generated by the use of such
loans as an income tax avoidance mechanism for the transferor. (em-
phasis added).2
The reason for our dismay is that these statements assume
that it is the law that a parent-lender can avoid (shift) income
tax liability by an interest-free demand loan. We would make
several points about this assumption which could make Dick-
man a disaster rather than a victory for the Government.
1. First, neither this Court, nor any other court, has ever
held that the lender can shift the income tax on income from
a gratuitous intrafamily interest-free demand loan. The issue
has not been litigated.
2. Second, there is no Revenue Ruling or Regulation (let
alone statutory provision) which states anything upon which
the Court's assumption could be based.
3. Third, this Court, over half a century ago, established a
principle opposite to that assumption, namely that a person
who transfers money by way of a revocable gift remains taxa-
ble on the income from that money even if it is paid to an-
other. In Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) which in-
volved the income taxation of the grantor of a revocable
2. Id. at 4224.
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family trust (economically indistinguishable from a gratuitous
interest-free demand loan), the question was the constitution-
ality of section 219(g) of the 1924 Revenue Act (the predeces-
sor of section 676 of the Code) which considered the grantor
of a revocable trust as the owner of the trust corpus, and thus
taxable on the trust income. Justice Holmes, writing for a
unanimous Court, went straight to the heart of the matter, in
language particularly relevant to demand loans:
[T]axation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it
is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for
which the tax is paid. If a man directed his bank to pay over income as
received to a servant or friend, until further orders, no one would doubt
that he could be taxed upon the amounts so paid. It is answered that in
that case he would have a title, whereas here he did not. But from the
point of view of taxation there would be no difference. The title would
merely mean a right to stop the payment before it took place. The same
right existed here although it is not called a title but is called a power.
The acquisition by the wife of the income became complete only when
the plaintiff failed to exercise the power that he reserved .... Still
speaking with reference to taxation, if a man disposes of a fund in such
a way that another is allowed to enjoy the income which it is the power
of the first to appropriate it does not matter whether the permission is
given by assent or by failure to express dissent. The income that is sub-
ject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his
own option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to
enjoy it or not.
281 U.S. at 378.
Although Corliss involved the constitutionality of section
219(g) Ipresently section 676a] of the 1924 Revenue Act, that
statutory provision was not a new statement of tax policy by
the Congress; rather, it was a clarification of what was implicit
in the development of the assignment of income principles
under the predecessor of section 61. That was the precise
holding of McCauley v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1930), which, although decided after Corliss, involved a tax
year prior to the effective date of section 219(g) of the 1924
Revenue Act. In holding that the grantor of a revocable trust
must include the trust income in his gross income under the
predecessor of section 61, the court relied directly on Corliss,
and stated:
It is true that the decision is under the Revenue Act of 1924... which
provided in terms that the grantor of a trust who reserved the power to
1983]
revest in himself title to any part of the corpus of the trust should be
liable for the tax. But that Revenue Act, as it appears to us from its
history, was merely declaratory of existing law.
44 F.2d at 920.
4. Fourth, the Court's assumption completely undermines
the grantor-trust provisions of the Code. If the Court's as-
sumption were correct, section 676, for example, is really a
dead letter since the assignment of income prevented by that
section could be accomplished by an interest-free demand
loan [either directly to a child, or to an otherwise irrevocable
trust for a child (a so-called "Crown Trust")].
Nor would the owner of income-producing property have
any need to worry about section 673 which requires that the
right to use property be given up for more than ten years (or
the life of the beneficiary) in order to shift income tax liabil-
ity. An interest-free demand loan would do the trick.
The Government's Brief has misled the Court on this
point. It states:
In addition, a holding that the instant loans do not result in taxable
gifts would substantially undercut the grantor trust income tax provi-
sions. If the settlor of a trust retains significant rights in or powers over
the corpus of the trust, the 1954 Code treats him as the owner of the
trust and he is taxable on any income earned by the trust. See 26
U.S.C. 671. See also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). In order
to avoid taxability on a trust's income, the settlor must create a trust of
at least 10 years' duration (26 U.S.C. 673), and must comply with the
other safeguards against retained powers or interests contained in 26
U.S.C. 674-677. These safeguards would be unavailing if a taxpayer
could, without gift tax liability, avoid the trust requirements merely
by making a demand loan to the desired beneficiary. The taxpayer
could then call the loan at any time, while the beneficiary could mean-
while invest the funds in income-producing assets, on which income
he, not the lender, would be taxed. (emphasis added).'
To say as the Government does that imposing a gift tax
on an interest-free demand loan would safeguard a grantor
trust provision such as section 676 suggests the following pro-
position: with the gift tax, the policy of section 676 would be
preserved for the interest-free demand loan, thus safeguarding
section 676 while, without the gift tax, the policy of section
676 would be thwarted by the use of such a loan.
3. Brief for Respondent at 21-22, Dickman, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4222.
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The error of this proposition is that even with gift tax
liability, the use of an interest-free loan would thwart the pol-
icy of section 676 unless the theory of that section is applied
to tax the lender of an interest-free demand loan under the
income tax.
Once again the fundamental error of the Government,
which is reiterated by this Court, as noted above, is the as-
sumption, restated in the last sentence of the above quote
that in an interest-free demand loan, "the beneficiary could
. ..invest the funds in income-producing assets, on which he,
not the lender, would be taxed." Such a result clearly violates
the principle of section 676 and Corliss v. Bowers and the
presence of a gift tax would not prevent such a violation. This
fact will not be lost on tax practitioners and financial advisors.
In the same vein, the Court's assumption undermines its
own previous holding in the assignment of income area, i.e.,
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Harrison v. Schaff-
ner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941). If, as Harrison v. Schaffner holds, a
parent cannot successfully shift income from rental property,
even by an irrevocable assignment to a child of the right to
one year's rent while retaining the reversion, how could it be
that a parent could successfully shift income by an interest-
free demand loan which. can be terminated at any time?
5. Fifth, and finally, the Court states that in order to
make a taxable gift, a transferor "must relinquish dominion
and control over the transferred property," and that in a de-
mand loan, the gift is not made upon the making of the loan
because of the power to demand it back.4 Thus the gift of use
value is made only "as time passes without a demand for re-
payment. ' 5 We agree! Indeed, this is exactly the rule adopted
by the Court in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283
(1933) in imposing the gift tax upon the grantor of a revocable
trust. Such an analysis for the gift tax, however, requires an
identical analysis for the income tax, to wit: the power to de-
mand is the power to revoke and, therefore, an income tax is
imposed on the lender as the borrower earns interest upon the
loan. Such a result is required by I.R.C. section 676(a) when




the loan is to a trust, as it was in Crown v. Commissioner, 585
F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978). And even when the loan is not to a
trust, this result is required under the theory of section 676(a)
expounded in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). Corliss
upheld the predecessor of section 676(a) on the ground that
the grantor of a revocable gift is the owner of the income due
to his "unfettered command" over the enjoyment thereof.
Corliss at 378.
Thus, the reason for imposing a gift tax, i.e., the transfer
of the use value during the period of non-demand, also re-
quires imposition of an income tax. Indeed, in upholding the
gift tax, Guggenheim specifically referred to and relied on its
decision and reasoning in Corliss v. Bowers. See Guggenheim,
288 U.S. at 283. And this very Court, in note 5 of Dickman,
reconstructs the transaction to illustrate the economics of it:
it's the same as a loan at interest with the lender receiving the
interest and then making a gift of it to the borrower." There is
a gift tax transfer; there is also a receipt taxable under the
income tax because these facts also illustrate the theory of
section 676.
In light of the above, it was a mystery to us how this
Court came upon the assumption that a parent can shift in-
come tax liability by an interest-free demand loan. Incredibly,
it turns out that this was the position taken in the Govern-
ment's Brief to this Court in this case.
7
*. . Paul and Esther C. Dickman shifted to Lyle and Artesian the in-
come that would be generated by the money lent them, thereby reduc-
ing their own income taxes and ultimately the amounts of their taxable
estates.
The concern here is that people will use gifts of income producing
property to split up an income taxable in a high bracket into smaller
incomes taxable in lower brackets. No-interest loans do just that.
Moreover, where the loans are payable on demand, the maker of the
loans is able to achieve this result without the inconvenience of losing
access to the principal should the need arise. 8
6. Id. at 4223 n.5.
7. Martin Ginsberg, in a recent article, Making Tax Law Through the Judicial
Process, 70 A.B.A.J. 74, 77 (1984), sees "a government that more than occasionally
litigates tax cases with eyes firmly shut to broader implications ......
8. This paragraph was part of the Government's footnote 25, and is a direct




If interest-free demand loans are not subject to gift taxes, the po-
tential loss of tax revenues may be quite substantial in light of the fact
that tax practitioners and financial advisors have recognized and widely
advocated the use of such loans as a device to split incomes and reduce
estate taxes. (emphasis added).
If this is the source of the assumption, the fact is that,
whether by design or neglect, the Government has misled the
Court about the law concerning the income taxation of inter-
est-free demand loans. If it was by design, it is a sad commen-
tary that in order to win a gift tax case, the Government felt
compelled to foist on this Court an assumption which is not
only erroneous but which it really cannot live with on the in-
come tax side-indeed, an assumption totally unnecessary to
the Court's decision which can stand on its own economic rea-
soning without the need of such a crutch.
The evidence, however, indicates that the Government's
position in its Brief in this case is more probably due to neg-
lect rather than design. Specifically we are referring to the
fact that the Government did not even cite Burnet v. Guggen-
heim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) which had basically already deter-
mined the issue before the Court in the present case. Indeed,
the essence of Treas. Reg. section 25-2511-2(b), which this
Court has adopted in its present opinion, was once a part of
the statute (Revenue Act of 1932, section 501(c)). After Gug-
genheim, however, the regulation was removed from the stat-
ute by Congress (Revenue Act of 1934, section 511) since, as
the House Report stated, "the principle expressed [in the
As the Seventh Circuit in Crown acknowledged (585 F.2d at 236; footnote
omitted):
and then follows the paragraph from Crown. Brief for Respondent at 19 n.25, Dick-
man, No. 82-1041 (U.S. 1984). The "footnote omitted" is footnote 3 of the Crown
opinion which states:
We do not mean to express any view with regard to the Commissioner's
contention, not part of this appeal, that the loans in this case gave rise to
constructive income to the Areijay partners taxable under the income tax.
Crown, 585 F.2d at 236 n. 3. In other words, in footnote 25 of its Brief, the Govern-
ment quoted the Crown text to support its argument that there was no income tax in
the lender of a gratuitous demand loan, but omitted, intentionally, the footnote which
disavowed the expression of any such view.
This footnote, our note 8, has been added in the interest of completeness and
clarification. It changes nothing with respect to the merits of our arguments received
by the Court.
9. Brief for Respondent at 19-20, Dickman, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4222.
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Regulation] is now a fundamental part of the law by virtue of
the Supreme Court's decision in the Guggenheim case." H.R.
Rep. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934).
Although the Government's Brief may have been the
source of the Court's assumption, it may also be that at a
more fundamental level the assumption about the income tax
treatment of interest-free demand loans may be the result of a
misconception about the manner in which the gift tax pro-
tects the income tax. To illustrate, it is clear that if a high
bracket parent gives a low bracket child a no-strings-attached,
outright gift of $100,000, the parent has successfully shifted
the income from the $100,000 to Child. Because the Parent is
permitted to shift the income by such an outright irrevocable
gift, subjecting this transaction to a gift tax minimizes the
Government's loss on the income tax side.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that the gift tax is
unnecessary to protect the income tax where the income tax
protects itself, i.e., where statutory provisions and judicially
developed principles prevent assignment of income. If, e.g.,
Parent establishes a revocable trust for Child, the gift tax ap-
plies to the income payments to the Child. Nevertheless, and
this is the point, Parent still must include in his or her in-
come the payments made to Child (section 676). The Child
excludes the payment under section 102. The same results
would obtain under this Court's assignment of income
principles.
If Parent assigns personal service income to Child (Lucas
v. Earl) or assigns interest (Horst) or rent (Schaffner) while
retaining the income-producing property, the assignment con-
stitutes a gift for gift tax purposes but the salary, interest or
rent is still included as income by the Parent and excluded
from income by Child under section 102.
If in all of these situations, the income tax is not in need
of protection because the assignment of income provisions or
principles prevent income shifting to lower bracket taxpayers,
why are these transactions subject to gift tax? The reason is
that after the assigned payment from a revocable trust, or sal-
ary, interest or rent, have been received by Child, the future
income from these amounts will be income to Child, not Par-
ent. In other words, in the case, e.g., of a revocable trust, sec-
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tion 676 prevents the income from the trust corpus from be-
ing shifted to Child. However, the future income earned by
the payments made to Child is permitted to be shifted. The
gift tax exacts a price for the successful shifting of the future
income from the trust income distributions. The gift tax is not
a price paid for shifting the income from the trust corpus
since that shifting is prohibited by section 676.
The same analysis is true for interest-free demand loans.
If Parent loans Child $100,000 interest free on demand and
the Child earns (or could have reasonably earned) $10,000, the
gift tax on the $10,000, which this Court has now upheld, is
exacted as a price for the successful shifting of the future in-
come from the $10,000. The income of $10,000, i.e., the in-
come from the $100,000, does not need gift tax protection
since under Corliss v. Bowers and this Court's other assign-
ment of income cases, the income from the $100,000 should be
taxed to Parent.
It is, indeed, ironic that the Court's assumption about the
income tax treatment of interest-free loans is made in the
context of expressed concern for minimizing "the potential
loss to the federal fisc." 10 Given the liberalized annual exclu-
sion and unified credit, both of which can effectively be
doubled because of the split gift provisions, and the unlimited
marital deduction, the real loss to the federal fisc will be the
income tax loss which will occur if the Court's assumption
about the income tax treatment of interest-free loans is relied
upon as a statement of the Court's view of what the law is, or
should be. If that were to occur, the Court's present decision
would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the fisc, "at the ex-
pense," as the Court has put it in Dickman, "ultimately, of all
other taxpayers and the government." '11
A further irony is the de facto repeal of the grantor trust
provisions of the Code, sections 671-678, as noted above.
Some of these provisions (sections 673-675 and 678) were en-
acted as the culmination, in 1954, of years of litigation in the
courts of the assignment of income cases (such as Horst,
Schaffner, and Clifford) and after the promulgation in 1945 of
10. Dickman, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4224.
11. Id.
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the Clifford Regulations. Section 676, on the other hand, was
enacted as far back as 1924 to prevent assignment of income
through the revocable trust device. The product of all this
time and effort will become so much deadwood unless Dick-
man is clarified on the income tax side to preserve the efficacy
of the grantor trust provisions.
In light of the above, we would urge the Court to remove
from the Dickman opinion, before it is published in the U.S.
Reports, the statements referred to at the outset of this letter.
At the least, we would urge that the Court make it clear, by
footnote or otherwise, that the assumption made in those
statements is not an indication that this Court is of the view
that the lower bracket child rather than the higher bracket
parent is taxed under the income tax on the income earned on
an interest-free demand loan.
We have tried to keep this letter as short as possible. An
elaboration of our views can be found on pp. 489-501 of Joyce
& Del Cotto, "Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey of a Misno-
mer," 35 Tax L. Rev. 459 (1980).
With highest regards,
Sincerely yours,
Louis A. Del Cotto






Legislation has recently been reported to the House of Repre-
sentatives by the Committee on Ways and Means to deal, inter
alia, with the income tax consequences of intrafamily interest-free
loans.12
12. Tax Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 162, reprinted in
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In its discussion of the "Present Law" in this area, the Report
of the Committee on Ways and Means takes note of the gift tax
holding of the Supreme Court in Dickman but does not advert to
the Court's statements regarding the income tax. Rather, the Com-
mittee states:
It is unclear whether, under present law, interest-free or below-market inter-
est rate loans from one family member to another have any Federal income
tax consequences. To date, courts have addressed only the gift tax conse-
quences of such transactions.
13
In contrast to the above is the Committee's rather blunt dis-
cussion when dealing with "Reasons for Change":
Family loans are being used to avoid the assignment of income rules and the
grantor trust rules. An interest-free or below-market interest rate family loan
involves a gratuitous transfer of the right to use the proceeds of the borrow-
ing until repayment is demanded (in the case of a demand loan) or until the
end of the term of the loan (in the case of a term loan). If the lender had
assigned the income from the property to the borrower, the assignment of
income doctrine would tax the lender on the income. If the lender had trans-
ferred the principal amount to a trust established for the benefit of the bor-
rower that was revocable at will (in the case of a demand loan), or that would
terminate at the end of a period of not more than 10 years (in the case of a
term loan), the income earned on trust assets would be taxed to the lender
under the grantor trust provisions set forth in Code secs. 671-679.1,
The bill in the main reflects the same views with respect to
interest-free loans as are held by the authors. 15
For demand loans the borrower is treated as paying the inter-
est and receiving it back in a manner conforming to the substance
71 FED. TAx REP. (CCH) (March 9, 1984); see H.R. REP. No. 432 pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1370-79 (discussing § 162 of Tax Reform Act and new § 7872 of the Internal
Revenue Code.)
13. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 12, at 1371. In Private Letter Ruling 8309002,
the position was taken that the assignment of income doctrine would not be applied
to make a corporation taxable on imputed interest where the corporation had made
interest-free demand loans apparently to shareholders. 313 IRS LTR. RuL. REP.
(CCH) 8309002 (Nov. 2, 1982). On October 4, 1983, Private Letter Ruling 8309002
was officially withdrawn by Private Letter Ruling 8403012, which stated: "Subsequent
to the issuance of LTR 8309002, the National Office decided that it was not appropri-
ate at this time to take any position regarding the application of the assignment of
income doctrine to the lender of interest-free loans." 360 IRS LTR. RuL. REP. (CCH)
8403012 (Oct. 4, 1983).
14. Id. at 1373-74.
15. An elaboration of our views with respect to interest-free loans can be found




of the transaction, e.g., as a gift, dividend, or compensation. For
term loans, the excess of the amount loaned over the present value
of the borrower's repayment obligation is an outright transfer to
the borrower as a gift, dividend, or compensation, etc. This excess
is then treated as original issue discount and interest is viewed as
received by the lender and paid by the borrower at a constant rate
over the term of the loan.
l"
The amount of interest, the "Applicable Federal Rate, ' 17 will
be, generally, the average yield in comparable United States obli-
gations. However, in the case of family loans (loans where the fore-
gone interest is a gift), the amount taxed to the lender is limited to
the borrower's income attributable to the loan. Thus, for family
loans made to finance "consumption items, such as higher educa-
tion, personal residences, etc. . ,",1 the lender's income is consid-
ered to be zero.1
This latter provision, in effect, introduces a tracing require-
ment in order to measure the income attributable to the loan. This
technique brings taxation of the lender of a demand loan closer to
that for revocable trusts. However, it creates problems in measur-
ing or tracing the actual income attributable to the loan, problems
which are avoidable.2 0 Moreover, it goes only half-way because it
only applies if the actual income is less than that produced by the
statutory rate.
There is a further exception for non-tax motivated transac-
tions involving small loans for short periods of time which do not
involve significant distortions of income.
For income tax purposes the bill treats all loans which involve
16. The borrower and lender are thus placed in the accrual method of accounting
and the loan is treated similar to a discount bond. See I.R.C. § 1232A (discount
bonds; recodified by proposed Tax Reform Act of 1984 at § 1272); Tax Reform Act of
1984 § 162(a) (proposing I.R.C. § 7872(a) & (b)). However, where the excess is a gift,
the bill treats term loans as demands loans.
17. Tax Reform Act of 1984 § 41 (proposing I.R.C. § 1274(d)).
18. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 12, at 1375.
19. This is a questionable result for loans spent for education since that expendi.
ture should be viewed as a cost of acquiring education, a long-time asset that nor-
mally produces future income, and not as "consumption." Compare H.R. REP. No.
432, supra note 12, at 1378-79, where the Committee indicates its desire for regula-
tions dealing with loans that produce future income, such as purchase of a deferred
annuity, to require that the future income be treated as attributable to the loan.
20. On this point, see Joyce & DelCotto, supra note 15, at 491-95. Cf. id. at 506
n.7 and accompanying text.
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gifts (i.e., "family loans") in the same manner as it treats demand
loans even if the loans are term loans. This can lead to some anom-
alous results. Suppose, for example, that G has $100 and the appli-
cable interest rate is 10%. If G invests the $100 for two years at
compound interest, he will have $121 ($10 interest in year one; $11
interest in year two). If G retains and invests only $83 of the $100
and transfers $17 of the $100 to B outright as a gift, then at the
end of two years G will have $100.43 ($8.3 interest in year one and
$9.13 interest in year two). B will have $20.57 ($1.7 interest in year
one and $1.87 interest in year two). By his outright gift to B of $17,
G will have successfully shifted $3.57 of interest income to B.
Now, however, suppose G engages in the economic equivalent
of this last example by way of a two year interest-free term loan to
B of $100.21 Under the bill, G must r6port $10 of interest income
both in year one and year two.2 2 By treating the loan as a demand
loan, the bill prevents income shifting that is clearly permissible
and which can be accomplished by a bifurcated transaction, i.e., a
term loan at market interest and an outright transfer with no re-
quirement of repayment.23
Moreover, under the bill, family term loans are treated in the
same way as demand loans, no matter how long the term. If, e.g.,
G makes an interest-free loan of $100 for ten years and a day to B,
under the bill G continues to report interest income yearly with no
shifting of income to B even though, if G had engaged in the eco-
nomically equivalent transaction of putting the $100 in trust for B,
retaining a reversion after ten years and a day, G would have suc-
cessfully shifted all the income to B over the trust term, under
21. The present value of $100 to be received in two years, given a 10% interest
rate, is approximately $83: $100 - (1.1)1.
22. It is not clear whether under the bill G would be required to include $10 or
$11 as foregone interest for year two. It seems more likely that the amount would be
$10 since the bill basically treats all family loans as demand loans. If the amount
reportable by G for year two is $10, then G would have been prevented from shifting
only $2.57, not $3.57, of interest income. The fact remains, however, that there exists
no good reason for preventing the shifting of any of the $3.57 interest income where
the loan is a term loan rather than a demand loan.
23. This result is especially ironic in light of the Committee's statement that
[t]he committee believes that an interest-free or below-market interest rate loan
is the economic equivalent of a loan with a market rate of interest required to be
paid by the borrower, and a payment by the lender to the borrower, to fund the
borrower's payment of interest.
H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 12, at 1373.
19831 601
602 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
section 673.
Finally, the bill is not clear as to the treatment of an interest-
free term loan or an interest-free demand loan, made to a trust
whose income is otherwise taxable to the grantor under section 673
or section 676.
Despite its various infirmities, if and when the proposed legis-
lation becomes law, it will go a long way towards neutralizing the
potential mischief for the income taxation of interest-free loans
created by Dickman. If it is not enacted into law, hopefully such
fact will not prevent substantially the same results from being
achieved under existing principles of law, despite the statements in
Dickman.
Whatever happens legislatively, the above letter is perhaps
more important as a comment on the judicial process than it is as a
statement of tax principles.
